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Abstract  
This paper examines flows of bad and good news as a feature of the firm’s information 
environment. We argue that to the extent that managers delay reporting bad news, this leads 
to bad news being more concentrated. Measuring flows of bad and good news using flows 
of negative and positive abnormal stock returns, we find that firms with higher volatility of 
operations and managerial incentives to withhold bad news exhibit relatively more 
concentrated bad news flows. This relative concentration is also positively associated with 
lower earnings quality and a higher risk of shareholder litigation. Our results suggest that 
the relative concentration of bad and good news flows is related to the quality of the firm’s 
information environment.  
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1. Introduction  
We examine whether some firms opportunistically manage the flow of bad versus 
good news to the market. Opportunistically managed news flows result in a smaller number 
of larger bad news announcements and a larger number of smaller good news 
announcements. As a critical part of the price discovery process, news flows shape the 
firm’s information environment. To capture the relative concentration of bad versus good 
news information flows, we construct a measure based on the occurrence of negative and 
positive abnormal stock returns. Intuitively our measure captures the difference in the 
number of days it takes for stock prices to reflect one unit of bad versus one unit of good 
news. We find that firms with higher operational volatility and managerial incentives to 
release good news on a timely basis but withhold bad news exhibit a higher relative 
concentration of bad news flows. We also find that firms with a higher relative 
concentration of bad news flows report lower quality earnings and have a higher risk of 
shareholder litigation. Our analysis suggests that the relative concentration of bad and good 
news flows is related to the quality of the firm’s information environment.  
Firms have discretion in timing their information releases. If investors are uncertain 
about whether a manager has received private information, a rational expectations 
equilibrium exists in which firms are better off delaying the release of bad news (Dye, 1985; 
Shin, 2003; Pae, 2005; Guttman, Kremer, and Skrzypacz, 2014). Firms that manage 
information flows opportunistically release good news immediately, but release bad news 
either at the same time as good news to cancel out the effect, or at the same time as other 
pieces of bad news when withholding is no longer possible. Ceteris paribus, this results in a 
larger number of smaller flows of good news and a smaller number of lumpier flows of bad 
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news, i.e., bad news flows are more concentrated than good news flows. We examine the 
relative concentration of bad versus good news flows across companies and over time.  
To do this, we construct a new measure of the flow of bad versus good news. We 
use abnormal returns to proxy for firm specific information flows. This choice is 
theoretically founded on information economics and empirically supported by evidence 
attributing substantial variation in abnormal stock returns to firm disclosures (Beyer et al. 
2010, p.300). Our measure, Bad v. good flows, distinguishes negative and positive abnormal 
stock returns and captures the difference between the number of days it takes prices to 
capture one unit of positive return versus one unit of negative return. This construction 
means that a positive value for Bad v. good flows indicates that bad news impounded in 
prices is more concentrated than good news and higher values indicate greater relative 
concentration of bad news flows.1 Conversely, a negative value for Bad v. good flows 
indicates that good news impounded in prices is more concentrated than bad news and 
lower values indicate greater relative concentration of good news flows. 
Across a large panel of company–years, we find that, on average, Bad v. good flows 
is negative, consistent with bad news being on average less concentrated than good news. 
This suggests that opportunistic management of news flows is not widespread. But in a 
substantial fraction of the population, about 30%, bad news is more concentrated than good 
news. Results by year and industry shows a substantial rise in this fraction in recent years, 
peaking in years of economic slowdown (e.g., 44% in 2002 and 48% in 2008), and within 
the high-tech sector, pharmaceuticals, and financial institutions.  
                                                 
1 Our construction means that Bad v. good flows is positive if prices reflect good news over more days than 
they reflect bad news, implying that bad news is relatively more concentrated. 
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To explore the construct validity of our measure we draw on theoretical and 
empirical literature on the strategic timing of information flows to derive a comprehensive 
list of factors that enable and induce managers to delay flows of bad versus good news (e.g., 
operating volatility, uncertainty about future operations, poor operating performance, 
corporate financing events, contractual considerations) and of relevant constraints (e.g., 
competing sources of information, information acquisition ability). Testing the association 
of Bad v. good flows with these factors, gives a positive association with operational 
volatility, firm growth, debt and equity issues, reporting of earnings declines and losses, and 
negative market news, and a negative association with option grants, firm size, higher levels 
of insider ownership, and investor turnover. Reporting poor operating performance in the 
financial statements seems to be the strongest managerial incentive for the relative 
concentration of bad news flows, consistent with previous evidence that firms with 
impending earnings declines accelerate good news releases during the year to mitigate the 
market’s response to negative earnings surprises (Miller 2002). This highlights the role of 
financial reporting in determining the flow of information to financial markets.  
We explore how the relative concentration of information flows relate to financial 
reporting by examining their association with properties of reported earnings. A key 
argument in the literature on the interaction between voluntary disclosure and financial 
reporting (see Francis et al., 2008 for a review) is that since information quality is 
endogenous, reported earnings and voluntary disclosure share similar features. We therefore 
expect the relative concentration of bad and good news flows to be associated with noisier 
reported earnings. We document a positive association between Bad v. good flows and 
common inverse measures of earnings quality, such as the Dechow and Dichev (2002) 
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measure of accruals quality, absolute abnormal accruals, and earnings variability. This 
association remains after controlling for factors associated with firm fundamentals, 
suggesting that the relative concentration of bad and good news flows is associated with 
noisier reported earnings driven by managerial discretion.  
An important consequence of concentrating bad news releases is that it may trigger 
class action lawsuits (Francis et al., 1994). Therefore, to the extent our measure captures the 
tendency to withhold bad and accelerate good news, we expect it to predict class action 
lawsuits. We document a positive association between Bad v. good flows and the probability 
of a class action lawsuit, controlling for other predictor variables, including earnings quality 
and stock return volatility. These results lend further credence to our measure.  
We perform additional tests to probe the robustness of Bad v. good flows in 
capturing corporate disclosure policy. First we investigate changes in Bad v. good flows in 
the four years surrounding CEO successions. We document a substantial fall in Bad v. good 
flows in the two years following successions, consistent with prior evidence of higher 
management discipline following CEO turnover. Second, we re-calculate Bad v. good flows 
retaining only trading days adjacent to earnings announcements (of annual and quarterly 
earnings) and to corporate filings to the SEC (10Ks, 10Qs, and 8Ks), and observe that the 
redefined measure exhibits similar properties. Third, we adjust our measure to remove 
variation driven by market- and industry-wide that could reflect an asymmetry in the 
market’s transmission speed of good versus bad news, and confirm that our results continue 
to hold.  Our results are also robust to re-calculating Bad v. good flows after removing days 
with revisions in analyst earnings forecasts or stock recommendations. Finally, we 
document two structural shifts in our measure following the enactment of corporate 
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governance and disclosure regulation during our sample period (antitakeover protection 
laws in the mid-1980s and disclosure regulation in the early 2000s), that arguably 
constrained managerial incentives and opportunity to withhold the flow of bad relative to 
good news.   
This paper contributes to the literature in three key ways. First, we construct a new 
measure of the relative concentration of information flows that relates directly to the quality 
of the firm’s information environment. Our measure captures the firm’s rate of information 
flows and offers a more holistic measure of the quality of a company’s communication with 
financial markets that goes beyond the quality of financial reporting in the audited financial 
statements. This measure is also founded on theories of voluntary disclosure and can be 
generated for the universe of listed firms. Our measure is particularly relevant to the stream 
of the voluntary disclosure that examines firms’ strategic timing of information flows, as it 
provides a way to identify evidence consistent with opportunistic withholding of bad news 
by a large cross-section of firms.  
Second our paper links the opportunistic management of information flows to stock 
returns in a systematic fashion. We argue that the opportunistic management of information 
flows involves accelerating good news while storing up bad news and releasing it either 
with good news to cancel out the effect, or with other bad news when further withholding is 
no longer feasible. This leads to a greater relative concentration of bad news flows, which is 
then reflected in stock returns. Our evidence contributes to the literature examining how 
corporate information flows affect stock return volatility (e.g., Acharya, De Marzo, and 
Kremer, 2011; Shin, 2003, 2006; Kalev, Liu, Pham, and Jarnecic, 2004) by highlighting the 
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implications of accelerating good news and withholding bad news for the properties of 
stock returns.    
Third, we contribute to the literature examining managerial incentives to delay the 
release of bad versus good news (for a review see Kothari, Shu, and Wysocki, 2009), by 
reaffirming the role of information asymmetry, managerial compensation, and insider 
ownership, and unravelling additional incentives relating to corporate financing transactions 
and poor operating performance, as well as an important constraint, namely institutional 
investor turnover. Our evidence suggests a strong link between the timing of information 
flows and the content and properties of reported earnings in the financial statements, 
highlighting the interplay between a firm’s communication channels and echoing the need 
to examine reporting choices as part of the firm’s overall communication strategy. At the 
same time our evidence confirms the link between a firm’s disclosure strategies and 
investor trading (Bushee and Noe, 2000), highlighting the role of capital market players in 
shaping the firms’ communication strategy.   
While our results show that, on average, U.S. firms display a higher relative 
concentration of good news, it remains the case that higher values of Bad v. good flows are 
consistent with less timely reporting of bad news relative to good news. Our study therefore 
focuses on managerial incentives to opportunistically withhold bad news that lead to a 
higher relative concentration of bad news. The greater relative concentration of good news, 
on average, for U.S. firms may reflect a common policy of conservative bad news reporting. 
This finding itself deserves further research, which could explore the reasons for the higher 
good news concentration with an emphasis on institutional factors, such as the litigious 
environment in the U.S., that could affect variation in the practice across jurisdictions.  
9 
 
2. Related literature and predictions 
Dye (1985) analyzes the circumstances and incentives behind the timing of 
information flows to capital markets. Assuming a given underlying distribution of cash 
flows, managers can time a firm’s information releases. The possibility for partial disclosure 
arises as a result of a key qualification of the revelation principle, that investors are 
uncertain about whether managers have received private information. When the manager 
does not disclose, investors are unsure whether the manager has received information but 
chosen to conceal it, or whether the manager has not received information. Dye (1985) 
shows that if the market is unsure whether management has received private information, a 
rational expectations equilibrium exists in which managers withhold news that is below a 
certain threshold, while releasing news that is above the threshold. Thus, managers may 
withhold bad news, with investors pooling non-disclosers with firms whose managers have 
genuinely received no news. Shin (2003) extends the analysis to a multiple-signal setting, 
and shows that in equilibrium managers follow a ‘sanitization’ strategy, in which they 
sanitize disclosures by removing the bad news and leaving the good news. With this 
strategy the return variance is higher following a bad news disclosure than following a good 
news disclosure. Also in a multiple-signal setting, Pae (2005) shows that a firm that receives 
two signals discloses both if both are favorable and confirm each other, discloses the most 
favorable signal if it is sufficiently favorable relative to the other, and discloses neither 
when both are unfavorable. This implies that managers may withhold bad news when they 
simultaneously receive good news. Guttman, Kremer, and Skrzypacz (2014) identify 
additional conditions that may lead managers to withhold bad news. Adding multi-periods 
to the multiple-signal setting, they show that the market interprets later disclosures more 
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favorably, and managers may withhold disclosure to take advantage of the option to wait for 
a better signal.  
An interesting property of investor uncertainty about the information that managers 
possess is that it decreases with time. Jung and Kwon (1988) address this issue, extending 
Dye’s (1985) model to allow investors to revise their beliefs that the manager has not 
received information. Using the revised conditional probabilities, Jung and Kwon show that 
the threshold level for which the manager withholds bad news is unique, and is inversely 
related to the probability that the manager has access to private information. This finding 
has two implications. First, since investors’ beliefs that managers have received information 
increase over time, managers release bad (good) news in late (early) announcements within 
the accounting period. Second, information intermediaries, e.g., the financial press and 
analysts, influence investors’ beliefs that managers have received information and can 
restrain managers’ ability to withhold bad news.  
We consider cases of opportunistic withholding of bad news that affect relative 
concentration. Firms that manage information flows opportunistically accelerate the release 
of good news, but withhold bad news to release it later, either at the same time as good 
news to offset the effect, or with further flows of bad news when withholding is no longer 
possible. The eventual release of bad news is inevitable when it becomes excessively costly 
for firms to hide it. This is the point when firms exhaust investor uncertainty that managers 
possess information, so continued withholding of bad news bears the risk of adverse 
consequences from outsiders perceiving even worse bad news. Accelerating good news and 
withholding bad news to release it either with good news or with other bad news leads to a 
greater relative concentration of bad versus good news releases. This prediction forms the 
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basis for constructing our measure of the relative concentration of bad versus good news 
during the year.  
Empirical studies of the strategic timing of information flows suggest that firms 
have incentives to either accelerate or decelerate the release of bad news. The former 
incentives relate to the tendency of firms to accelerate bad news to preempt shareholder 
litigation or lower the exercise price of stock options to maximize option gains (Kasznik 
and Lev, 1995; Skinner, 1994, 1997; Baginski, Hassel, and Kimbrough, 2002; Aboody and 
Kasznik, 2000; Donelson, McInnis, Mergenthaler, and Yu, 2012). The latter incentives 
relate to the tendency of firms to delay releasing bad news when managers wish to manage 
markets perceptions, face greater career concerns, or have personal wealth at stake (Dye and 
Sridhar, 1995; Shin, 2003; Kothari, Shu, and Wysocki, 2009). We add to this literature by 
considering further managerial incentives to strategically time information flows relating to 
the firm’s internal information needs (capital raising needs, contemporaneous operating 
performance, properties of reported earnings) and the external information environment 
(capital market intermediaries, institutional ownership). We also add to this literature by 
proposing a new approach to identify firms that may be opportunistically managing 
information flows.  
Extensive research on corporate disclosure and the financial reporting environment 
offers proxies for disclosure quality (for a review see Healy et al., 2001 and Beyer et al., 
2010). Among these proxies, the AIMR-FAF ratings, discontinued since 1995, were 
arguably the most comprehensive as they evaluated corporate disclosures of US firms 
through multiple channels (e.g., annual reports, analyst meetings, conference calls). Other 
large-sample computer-based measures cover solely corporate disclosures in annual reports 
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(e.g., Li, 2008; Li, 2010; Kothari, Li, and Short, 2009). We contribute to this literature by 
constructing a large-sample measure of disclosure quality that covers all communication 
channels that firms use, as it is based on share price changes. While our measure reflects 
corporate disclosure practices, it inevitably captures effects of capital market intermediaries 
and institutional investors. We address this caveat empirically.      
3. Research design  
3.1 A measure of the relative concentration of bad versus good news flows 
To measure information flows, we use the abnormal returns from a market model to capture 
firm specific information flows (Acharya et al., 2011; Shin, 2003, 2006; Kalev, Liua, 
Phamb, and Jarnciss, 2004).2 Beyer et al. (2010) provide evidence supporting the theoretical 
association between abnormal returns and firm specific information flows by reviewing 
how key sources of accounting disclosures contribute to the information in security prices.  
Their results indicate that for the average US firm, about 30% of its quarterly stock return 
variance occurs on days when there are accounting disclosures, with management forecasts 
contributing the most information, followed by earnings announcements and SEC filings. 
While firms also disclose through additional channels (e.g. conference calls, investor days, 
meetings with analysts, press releases), this evidence attributes substantial variation in stock 
returns to firm disclosures.  
As we wish to capture the relative concentration of bad versus good news flows, we 
distinguish negative and positive abnormal returns. We then measure the number of days 
that it takes stock price to capture one unit of each news type. We label the separate 
                                                 
2 We regress daily firm stock returns (Ret) on daily market value-weighted returns and obtain abnormal returns 
(AR) by adding the intercept to the regression residual. We set AR to zero when Ret equals zero. We obtain 
similar results recalculating our measure using raw instead of abnormal returns.  
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measures of bad and good news flows Bad flows and Good flows and derive our measure of 
the relative concentration of bad versus good news, Bad v. good flows, as the difference 
between Good flows and Bad flows.3  
Bad v. good flows = Good flows − Bad flows    (1) 
Higher values of Bad v. good flows indicate greater relative concentration of bad relative to 
good news, i.e., bad news concentrated in fewer days than good news.  To calculate Bad 
flows, the weighted average number of days for stock price to capture one unit of negative 
news during the year, we calculate the weighted average negative abnormal return 
transmitted daily standardized by total negative returns in the year. The weights are the 
(fractional) ranks, in order of magnitude, of standardized negative abnormal returns 
transmitted daily within each firm–year (assigning one to the highest). In detail 
 , , , ,1      nit i d i t i d i tiBad flows AR Tot AR Rank Tot AR           (1) 
where ,i dAR  is firm i’s abnormal stock return on day d if negative, , i tTot AR  is the sum of 
firm i’s daily negative abnormal returns in year t, ,i dRank  is the rank of , , i d i tAR Tot AR  for 
firm i in year t, and n is the number of days of negative abnormal stock returns. We take the 
natural log of all returns. We define Good flows similarly as 
 , , , ,1      pit i d i t i d i tiGood flows AR Tot AR Rank Tot AR            (2) 
where ,i dAR  is firm i’s abnormal return on day d, if positive, , i tTot AR  is the sum of firm i’s 
daily positive abnormal stock returns in year t, ,i dRank  is the rank of , , i d i tAR Tot AR   for firm i 
in year t and p is the number of days of positive abnormal stock returns. 
                                                 
3 We take this difference because if bad news is more concentrated than good news, bad news concentrates in 
fewer days than good news and Good news minus Bad news is positive. 
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To give the intuition for our information flow measures, we provide three examples. 
To simplify the exposition, we assume the number of trading days in a year is three. While 
all the news is positive in the examples, they apply equally to bad news flows, since the 
standardization cancels negative signs.    
Example 1: All news transmits on one day  
To calculate Good flows we first calculate the fraction of (abnormal) returns impounded in 
price on each day by dividing individual daily returns by the total return and rank this 
fraction from largest to smallest in column C. We use fractional ranks, i.e., we assign the 
median rank to tied cases. 
 A B C D 
 Return Return/Total Fractional rank B × C 
Day 1  0.6 1.0 1 1.0 
Day 2 0.0 0.0 2.5 0.0 
Day 3 0.0 0.0 2.5 0.0 
Total  0.6 1.0  1.0 
Good flows D/A = 1.0/0.6 = 1.67   
 
Total D gives the weighted average number of days over which price captures the news, one 
day in this example. Good flows is Total D divided by Total A, i.e., 1.0/0.6 = 1.67 days, 
giving the weighted average number of days for stock price to capture one unit of positive 
return.  
 
Example 2: News transmits evenly over three days 
 A B C D 
 Return Return/Total Fractional rank B*C 
Day 1  0.2 1/3 2 2/3 
Day 2 0.2 1/3 2 2/3 
Day 3 0.2 1/3 2 2/3 
Total  0.6 1.0  2.0 
Good flows D/A = 2.0/0.6 = 3.33    
 
In this case the average number of days for stock price to capture news is 2. Good flows is 
2.0/0.6 = 3.33 days.  
 
Example 3: News spreads over three days, with half on the most informative day, one third 
on the second most informative day, and one sixth on the least informative day.  
 A B C D 
 Return Return/Total Fractional rank B*C 
Day 1  0.3 1/2 1 ½ 
Day 2 0.2 1/3 2 2/3 
Day 3 0.1 1/6 3 ½ 
Total  0.6 1.0  1.67 
15 
 
 
In this case the average number of days over which the news transmits is 1.67. Good flows 
is 1.67/0.6 = 2.78 days. 
 
The total news in each example is 0.6. However the weighted average number of days over 
which stock price captures the news varies from 1, at one extreme where all news 
concentrates in one day, to 2 at the other extreme where news is equally dispersed over the 
three days. Dividing the weighted average number of days by the total abnormal return 
shows how long on average it takes for price to reflect one unit of information. For a given 
total amount of news, higher values of the flow measure are consistent with news that is less 
concentrated.  Accordingly, for our measure of the relative concentration of bad versus 
good news, Bad v. good flows, we take the difference between Good flows and Bad flows. 
Higher values of Bad v. good flows indicate greater relative concentration of bad news, 
consistent with an increasing tendency for companies to opportunistically withhold bad 
news.  
 
3.2 Determinants of the relative concentration of information flows  
Having calculated our measure of the relative concentration of information flows we 
study the factors that cause this to vary over companies and years. We group these factors 
into three categories. The first includes factors relating to the firm’s business and 
information environment that affect investor uncertainty about whether managers have 
private information and therefore the scope for timing releases of bad and good news. The 
second includes managerial incentives for timing information releases relating to 
contractual and other gains that managers can achieve by managing information flows. The 
third includes constraints on managers’ ability to time information flows resulting from 
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external information intermediaries who can reduce investor uncertainty that managers have 
received information. Examining how our relative concentration measure varies with these 
factors sheds light on the underpinnings of managing information flows and serves as a 
construct validity test of our measure.  
We regress Bad v. good flows, on the three vectors of variables capturing the 
business environment, management incentives, and constraints as follows, 
, ,
, , ,
i t i t
i t i t i t
Bad  v. good flows Business environment
                                      Management incentives Constraints e
 
  
 
    (3) 
Exhibit 1 summarizes the model components and variables. Below we describe the 
components of each vector that may influence the relative concentration of information 
flows.    
Business environment 
The firm’s information environment may affect investor uncertainty about whether 
managers have private information and therefore the scope for managing information flows 
to financial markets. We first consider the volatility of the firm’s operations. A volatile 
business environment increases uncertainty about managers’ private information, making 
investors less sure whether the manager has received information but chosen to withhold it 
or whether the manager has not received information. Managers of firms with volatile 
operations therefore have greater flexibility to strategically time bad new releases. To 
capture volatility in the business environment, we include the firm’s idiosyncratic return 
volatility, σAR, and an indicator of membership of a high-tech industry, HighTech. 
Appendix A provides exact definitions of all variables. As higher return volatility also 
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reflects a higher rate of news arrival (Kalev et al. 2004), including σAR also allows for the 
higher discretion to time information flows afforded by higher rates of news arrival.  
Investor uncertainty about whether a manager is informed is higher for newly listed 
and high growth firms. Managers of newly listed firms face stronger incentives to withhold 
bad news as they need to maintain a positive outlook in the market to survive the listing and 
maintain a record of growth. Newly listed firms face a higher likelihood of negative 
earnings news leading to lawsuits (Beneish 1997). Growth stocks also face an asymmetric 
market response to bad news (Skinner and Sloan 2002). Investors may raise their 
expectations of future sales and growth for firms with high past growth, inflating price 
multiples. Over time, if managers of these firms disclose information suggesting that 
optimistic expectations in price multiples are not sustainable, inferior stock price 
performance ensues. To account for managers’ ability and incentives to withhold bad news 
for newly listed and high growth firms, we include the number of years the company has 
been listed (YrsListed) and the firm’s compound annual sales growth rate (Salesgrowth).  
Management incentives  
Managers are likely to opportunistically withhold bad news releases to financial 
markets if they perceive net benefits to doing so. We consider incentives relating to 
operating performance, contractual considerations, and corporate financing events.  
a. Operating Performance  
Earnings news in the financial statements may induce managers to time the flow of 
news to the market throughout the period. Bagnoli and Watts (2007) hypothesize that 
negative earnings news in the financial report creates incentives for managers to voluntarily 
disclose more private information to mitigate the market’s response to negative earnings 
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surprises. Miller (2002) observes that firms with impending earning declines provide 
regular short-term forecasts that allow them to focus on current positive news and avoid 
discussing the impending decline. Such disclosure strategies enable managers to reap the 
benefits of high disclosure while avoiding the negative effect of unreliable forward-looking 
statements on their reputations and exposure to litigation risk. This is consistent with 
managers strategically withholding bad news when facing earnings declines. To account for 
managerial incentives to time information flows in view of impending bad news in reported 
earnings we include an indicator of reported earnings declines (NegΔEarn) and of losses 
(NegEarn). We also control for the level of operating performance by including return on 
assets (ROA).  
We consider separately the role of bad market news. Acharya et al. (2011) suggest 
that when firm performance correlates with market conditions, negative market news elicit a 
clustering of negative announcements by firms, even when the arrival of the underlying 
information is not clustered. The reason for firms’ clustering of bad news releases in this 
case is because of the more favorable interpretation of a firm’s disclosures in the presence 
of negative market news. To account for managerial incentives to cluster disclosures of bad 
news with bad market news, we include the proportion of days in the fiscal year with 
negative market returns (NegMRetDays).  
b. Contractual considerations 
Compensation plans may affect managers’ disclosure decisions. When managers 
receive stock options, they may adopt disclosure strategies to maximize trading profits on 
their portfolios. When managers receive stock option grants, they have incentives to 
disclose bad news and withhold good news, to minimize stock price. Aboody and Kasznik 
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(2000) find that CEOs delay good news and accelerate bad news around stock option grant 
dates. Conversely, when managers are considering exercising stock options, they have 
incentives to delay bad news or accelerate good news.4 Noe (1999) finds that insider sales 
increase primarily following good news management earnings forecasts. As stock option 
grants and exercisable options induce different disclosure strategies, we include the number 
of options granted, #OptionsGrant, and the number of exercisable stock options, 
#OptionsEx.  
Manager’s equity ownership may affect the strategic timing of information flows, 
with the effect varying with the ownership level. At lower managerial ownership levels 
evidence suggests that managers engage in stronger selling activity (Core and Larcker, 2002; 
Ofek and Yermack, 2000) that may induce a strategy of withholding bad news.5 At higher 
levels of ownership managers are less likely to strategically time disclosures. Firms with 
higher managerial ownership have reduced agency and monitoring costs so their managers 
are less likely to be concerned about the stock price reaction to unfavorable information. To 
account for a non-linear effect of managerial ownership on the relative concentration of 
information flows, we include both DirStk% and its square, DirStk%2, to capture the effects 
of lower levels of ownership.6 
c. Corporate financing events 
                                                 
4 A constraint on this disclosure pattern is litigation costs associated with insider sales strategies. Cheng and 
Lo (2006) find that insider sales do not motivate changes in disclosure. We account separately for the effect of 
litigation when considering constraints on the asymmetric timing of information flows.  
5 Core and Larcker (2002) find that firms with low managerial ownership are more likely to grant options to 
managers to increase their equity exposure, while Ofek and Yermack (2000) show that managers receiving 
option grants diversify their risk by selling shares.  
6 Yeo, Tan, Ho, and Chen (2002) also find a non-linear association between managerial ownership and the 
informativeness of earnings; at low (high) levels of management ownership the informativeness of earnings 
increases (decreases) with managerial ownership. 
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If a firm intends to issue additional equity to finance future operations within an 
accounting period, managers face incentives to withhold information that might have a 
negative price impact to avoid exacerbating the negative stock market reaction due to 
information asymmetry. Research suggests that around equity offerings firms follow 
disclosure strategies to lower the cost of equity capital, e.g., making more frequent, detailed, 
and optimistic disclosures about their performance in anticipation of the offering (Lang and 
Lundholm 2000). 7  To account for managerial incentives to withhold bad news during 
seasoned equity offerings, our model includes an indicator of issues of common or preferred 
stock (SEO). 
Debt issues can also affect managers’ disclosure decisions. Managers face strong 
incentives to withhold bad news around debt issues as debtholders are concerned more 
about bad than good news. Due to their asymmetric payoff function, debtholders have a 
limited ability to benefit from increases in firm value. Conversely, bad news implies a 
higher risk of default that affects their payoff directly. Consistent with this, Easton et al. 
(2009) find that bond trades increase around earnings announcements, especially when they 
convey bad news, and bond prices react more strongly to negative unexpected earnings. 
Similarly, DeFond and Zhang (2011) find that the bond market reacts more strongly to bad 
than to good news.8 To account for managerial incentives to withhold bad news when firms 
issue debt, we include an indicator of long-term debt issues (DebtIssues). 
                                                 
7 There is arguably a cost to strategically timing information releases around equity offerings. Lee and Masulis 
(2009) find that lower information quality, proxied by the quality of accruals, is associated with higher 
underwriting fees and a higher probability of a withdrawn equity offering. For equity offerings to induce 
withholding of bad news, the net gain that managers make by hiding information must outweigh the implied 
costs.  
8 Similar to equity issues there is a related reputational cost to strategically withholding bad news during debt 
issues. Ashbaugh et al. (2006), Bharath et al. (2008), Boubakri and Ghouma (2008), and Graham et al. (2008) 
provide evidence that rating agencies and bondholders assign lower credit ratings and charge higher debt costs 
to firms with poor information quality. 
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The role of news in the debt market depends on the risk of debt (Easton et al. 2009). 
When a company approaches default, debtholders face a higher risk of economic loss and, 
therefore, news about firm performance is more relevant. As the relevance of bad news for 
the debt market increases with default risk, so do managers’ incentives to withhold bad 
news. Default risk may also lead to biased information flows through their effect on 
managers’ career concerns. Kothari, Shu, and Wysocki (2009) argue that when managers 
approach financial default, their career concerns about contract termination increase and 
they face greater incentives to delay bad news. To account for the effect of default risk on 
the timing of bad news flows, we include the company’s debt to total assets ratio, 
Debt/Assets.  
Constraints 
a. Competing sources of information  
Larger firms have superior communication channels that increase the market’s 
ability to be informed about the firm. Therefore, managers of larger firms have less 
flexibility to time information releases. To account for the effect of firm size on the 
asymmetric timing of information flows, we include the company’s market capitalization, 
MktCap. Similar to larger firms, firms followed by more analysts have more information 
available to outsiders (Duchin, 2010), constraining managers’ ability to strategically time 
information flows to the market. Evidence also suggests, however, that analysts’ incentives 
to initiate coverage are stronger for stocks that they expect to perform well (Hayes, 1998), 
as this ensures a higher trading volume, allowing analysts to maximize their commissions. 
Irvine (2001) confirms this and shows that analysts realize higher trading commissions 
when they issue regular positive stock recommendations. This means analysts favor 
22 
 
following firms with regular good news flows, as this ensures more business, regular Buys, 
and higher revenues. The association between analyst coverage and the dispersion of bad 
and good news is, therefore, an empirical question. We capture analyst coverage by the 
number of analysts following the company, #Anal.  
b. Institutional information acquisition 
The ability of institutional investors to acquire private information may restrain 
managers’ strategic timing of information flows. Similar to Maffett (2012), we measure 
institutions’ ability to acquire private information based on their investment horizon. Prior 
research suggests transient institutions, i.e., those with short investment horizons, are more 
likely to seek and trade based on private information than non-transient institutions, i.e., 
those with long-term investment horizons (Yan and Zhang, 2009; Bushee and Goodman, 
2007; Bushee and Noe, 2000). The key factor inducing the information acquisition process 
is trading frequency, which allows investors to exercise governance through the alternative 
exit channel of selling shares (Edmans et al., 2013; Edmans, 2009). To account for the 
restraining effect of investor trading frequency on managers’ ability to strategically time 
information flows, we calculate a measure of investor turnover (InvestorTurnover) based on 
the churn rates of the firm’s institutional holdings, i.e., the average frequency with which 
institutional investors rotate positions in their portfolios (Gaspar et al., 2005).9 Higher rates 
indicate higher trading frequency and shorter investment horizons.10 Analyst coverage and 
                                                 
9 Calculating investor turnover rates involves two stages. First, we calculate for each institutional investor a 
measure of portfolio turnover in each quarter (Gaspar et al., 2005 p.143). Second, we calculate the investor 
turnover ratio at the firm level by calculating the weighted average of the total portfolio churn rates of its 
institutional investors over the four quarters each year.    
10 As an alternative measure of investment turnover we use the classification of Bushee (2001) and Bushee and 
Noe (2000) of institutional investors into transient and non-transient institutions. Transient institutions have 
high portfolio turnover. Non-transient institutions include dedicated institutional investors that hold large and 
stable holdings in a small number of firms and quasi-indexers that hold large diversified portfolios and trade 
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institutional trading are also important for our specification to control for variation in the 
relative concentration of bad versus good news flows driven by analysts and institutional 
trading rather than managerial disclosures.  
c. Shareholder litigation risk 
An important constraint managers face in timing information releases to the market 
is the risk of shareholder litigation if they withhold bad news. Fear of litigation may induce 
managers to disclose bad news promptly (Skinner 1994, Kasznik and Lev 1995, Field et al. 
2005). If managers reveal bad news promptly, they avoid large stock price drops upon 
earnings announcements that may trigger class action lawsuits (Francis et al. 1994). To 
account for the constraining effect of litigation risk on managers’ timing of information 
flows we include an indicator variable for firms operating in high legal exposure industries, 
HighLit, similar to Field et al. (2005).  
4. Sample and results  
4.1 Sample  
To compute our measure of the asymmetric timing of information flows we obtain 
daily stock returns from CRSP. For factors affecting the relative concentration of 
information flows we obtain accounting data from Compustat, stock market data from 
CRSP, executive compensation data from ExecuComp, analyst forecast data from I/B/E/S, 
lawsuit cases from the Securities Class Action Clearinghouse (securities.stanford.edu), and 
institutional ownership data from Thomson Reuters. The initial sample with available 
accounting, lawsuit, and stock market data from Compustat and CRSP consists of 158,915 
firm–years over fiscal years 1964 to 2012. Standard & Poor’s ExecuComp database offers 
                                                                                                                                                     
infrequently (Bushee and Noe 2000). As data on this classification is available up to 2009, we report our main 
results using InvestorTurnover.  
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executive compensation data for the firms in the S&P1500 Index from 1992. Adding 
compensation data from ExecuComp, analyst forecast data from I/B/E/S, and institutional 
ownership data from Thomson Reuters reduces the sample to 15,240 observations over 
1992–2012. We report our multivariate analysis separately for each sample to maximize the 
number of usable observations. To limit the influence of outliers, we winsorize all variables 
at the 0.5% and 99.5% percentiles. 
We estimate the multivariate regression models using robust standard errors with 
clustering by firm and year to control for cross-sectional dependence and heteroskedastic 
and autocorrelated residuals. We include annual dummies to control for year fixed effects. 
4.2 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 presents statistics for our concentration measures, Bad flows, Good flows, 
and Bad v. good flows, capturing the relative concentration of information flows. Panel A 
reports overall statistics. The average number of days over which a unit of bad news 
transmits, Bad flows, is higher (15.1 days) than the good news equivalent (13.8 days) across 
the sample firms. The average relative concentration of bad news is negative at −1.321, with 
a considerable standard deviation of almost three days (2.884). This negative relative 
concentration is also evident in the unstandardized averages; the weighted average number 
of days it takes for bad news to show up in prices is 31 days, compared to 28 days for good 
news (not tabulated).11 Hence, on average for US firms, bad news spreads over more days 
than good news. However, relative concentration of bad news is positive in 29% of firm–
years. For this sub-sample (panel B), the average relative concentration of bad news is 
1.627 with units of bad news spread over 14.1 days compared to 15.7 days for good news.  
                                                 
11 The negative relative concentration is also evident in the number of days with negative versus positive 
abnormal returns (102 versus 95 days).  
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Panel C reports statistics across years. Over the five decades of data in our sample, 
mean Bad v. good flows is negative but increases from a low of −2.796 in the 1960s to 
−0.987 during 2000–2012. In this latest period, bad news is more concentrated than good 
news (Bad v. good flows > 0) in 33% of firm–years. A within-year analysis shows a 
substantial rise in this percentage to 44% in 2002 and 48% in 2008, both years when US 
firms faced adverse economic conditions. In these years, mean Bad v. good flows is at its 
highest, reaching −0.015 in 2008. This pattern suggests an association between the relative 
concentration of bad news and periods of economic downturns, when more firms are prone 
to withholding bad news.12 
Table 1, panel D reports statistics across the 48 Fama–French industry groups. 
Among the industries with the highest fraction of firms where bad news is more 
concentrated than good news (Bad v. good flows > 0) are communication (telephone and 
other communication companies), real estate, business services (including computer 
programming and other related services), healthcare, electronic equipment, chemicals, retail, 
and banking. Most of these industries have higher flows of both good and bad news than the 
sample average of 14 days.  
Table 2 reports statistics for the other variables hypothesized to affect variation in 
the relative concentration of bad news across firms. For accounting and stock market 
variables we report statistics on the full sample (158,915 observations), while for analyst, 
                                                 
12 We also note a substantial increase in both bad and good news flows in 2004 (bad flows rise from 15 to 
almost 18 days and good flows rise from 14 to 17). This rise is sustained up to 2007 and from 2010 to 2012. 
This pattern likely reflects the acceleration of information flows targeted by the 2004 SEC ruling for 8-K 
disclosures. In mid-2004 the SEC expanded considerably the number of events that are reportable on Form 8-
K under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to include events like entry to material definitive agreements, 
considerations under business combinations, creation of financial obligations, events triggering off-balance 
sheet arrangements, etc. Further to the increase in reportable events, the SEC shortened the filing deadline to 
four business days after the occurrence of an event triggering the disclosure requirements of the form. Both 
provisions were intended to provide investors with better and faster disclosure of important corporate events.    
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compensation, and institutional ownership data we report statistics on the smaller sample 
(15,240 observations). We note though that the variables exhibit similar distributions in 
both samples.13 The average firm in our sample has a listing history of 13 years, but with a 
standard deviation of 11 years, so we capture the effect of newly listed firms. By design, 
average relative size (market capitalization adjusted for the year and industry average) is 
close to one (1.047). The average frequency of equity issues is 2.4%, of debt issues is 45%, 
profit decreases 40%, and reported losses 28%. The average fraction of trading days with 
negative market news is 47%. Almost one in five sample firms operates in a high-tech 
industry or one with high legal exposure. Finally, sample firms on average have a following 
of 12 analysts, 4% of their stock held by managers, and a turnover rate of 31%, which 
means the average firm’s institutional investors turn over 17% of their portfolios in a 
quarter, or around 62% in a year, implying an average institutional investor holding horizon 
of 19 months.   
Table 3 reports the averages of key variables separately for firms with more 
concentrated bad than good news (Bad v. good flows > 0) and the remaining sample firms 
(Bad v. good flows ≤ 0). For firms with Bad v. good flows > 0, mean Bad v. good flows is 
1.627, indicating that for these firms, bad news flows are more concentrated than good news 
flows by over one and a half days. This contrasts with the average Bad v. good flows of 
−2.509 for the remaining firms. The difference in Bad v. good flows between the two groups 
is due to the lower concentration of good news (15.8 vs. 12.9 days) and the higher 
concentration of bad news (14.1 vs. 15.5 days).  Firms with positive Bad v. good flows have 
worse operating performance (earnings declines, losses, lower ROA), lower sales growth, 
                                                 
13 The most noticeable differences are in years listed, ROA, and size, which have higher means in the smaller 
sample, consistent with the latter capturing longer listed, more profitable, and larger firms.  
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higher leverage, a higher frequency of equity and debt issues, higher analyst coverage, 
lower investor turnover and insider ownership, and are more likely to operate in a high 
litigious industry. 
Taken together, the results in tables 1–3 suggest that the practice of opportunistic 
withholding of bad news is not widespread; U.S. firms concentrate good news more than 
bad news. Nonetheless, the evidence suggests that the opportunistic withholding of bad 
news occurs in a substantial portion of the population, about 30%. This relative 
concentration of bad news appears to be associated with adverse economic conditions, poor 
operating performance, capital raising, and capital market participation.  
4.3 Empirical Results  
4.3.1 Determinants of the relative concentration of information flows   
Table 4 reports the results of regressing Bad v. good flows on the three vectors of 
variables capturing the business environment, management incentives, and constraints 
(equation 3). The first column reports results on the full sample, where we retain all 
business environment variables, all variables proxying for managerial incentives unrelated 
to executive compensation, and constraints related to firm size and litigation risk. Bad v. 
good flows varies with three of the four business environment factors in the predicted 
direction. Idiosyncratic return volatility and sales growth have positive coefficients (9.621, t 
= 5.20 and 0.064, t = 3.14), and listing age has a negative coefficient (−0.007, t = −2.44).14 
This evidence suggests that the volatility and growth rate of the company’s business 
environment are the key factors enabling a higher relative concentration of bad news. Bad v. 
good flows also varies with six of the seven managerial incentives proxies, increasing with 
                                                 
14 Repeating the analysis using the standard deviation of sales or the standard deviation of operating cash 
flows as alternative measures of business volatility to σAR, leaves the results qualitatively similar.  
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reporting of earnings declines, losses, negative market news, ROA, equity offerings, and 
debt issues.15 This evidence reaffirms poor operating performance reported in the financial 
statements and capital raising activities as key firm drivers of the relative concentration of 
bad versus good news and negative market news as an important incremental trigger of bad 
news clustering. 16  Finally, Bad v. good flows is inversely associated with market 
capitalization (−0.228, t = −2.36), suggesting that firm size constrains the higher relative 
concentration of bad versus good news. In column 2 we add lagged Bad v. good flows to 
capture the dynamics of timing information flows. Lagged Bad v. good flows has a positive 
coefficient (0.107, t = 10.19), consistent with firms’ information disclosure strategies 
having a persistent component. Collectively these results suggest that the relative 
concentration of bad versus good news flows persists over time, increases with the 
company’s operational volatility, growth rate, reporting of bad earnings news in the 
financial statements, negative market news, and debt and equity issues, and decreases with 
firm size.  
The third column of Table 4 presents the results of regressing Bad v. good flows on 
all variables capturing the business environment, management incentives, and constraints. 
Some additional insights emerge from this. First, Bad v. good flows increases with 
managerial ownership at lower levels of ownership (DirStk%2 = 2.346 t = 2.77) and with 
                                                 
15 Since the indicator of earnings declines, NegΔEarn, is the strongest managerial incentives proxy associated 
with Bad v. good flows, we investigate further the role of the sign of news that the manager possesses on the 
timing of information flows. NegΔEarn identifies realized bad news about the profitability of invested assets. 
The manager, however, also has information about future investments that can affect information flows during 
the year. To investigate the role of expected bad news, we add an identifier, NegREV1, of firm–year 
observations where the analyst consensus EPS forecast for the subsequent year (FY2) is revised downwards 
following this year’s earnings announcement (FY1). We find that Bad v. good flows is positively associated 
with NegREV1, consistent with both expected and realized bad news triggering the relative concentration of 
bad versus good news flows.  
16 We obtain similar results when we use an indicator of negative cumulative market returns during the firm’s 
fiscal year as an alternative measure for negative market news. 
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analyst coverage (#Anal = 0.031, t = 3.62). Second, relative concentration of bad news 
decreases with option grants (#OptionsGranted = −0.044, t = −1.96), managerial ownership 
at higher levels of ownership (DirStk% = −2.054, t = −2.94) and with institutional investor 
turnover (InvestorTurnover = −1.983, t = −5.45).17 These results suggest that low levels of 
insider ownership and high analyst following are additional drivers of the relative 
concentration of bad versus good news and higher levels of insider ownership and investor 
turnover are important constraints. The results also suggest an inverse association between 
stock option grants and the relative concentration of bad news, consistent with the evidence 
of Aboody and Kasznik (2000) that firms accelerate bad news around periods of stock 
option grants. 
Taken together, the results in Table 4 suggest that the relative concentration of bad 
news flows persists and is associated with volatile operations, bad earnings news in the 
income statement and in the market, debt and equity issues, managerial ownership, firm size, 
stock option grants, analyst coverage, and investor turnover. As well as offering insights 
into the determinants of the relative concentration of information flows, these results 
provide construct validity to our measure by associating it with the company’s business 
environment, managerial incentives, and capital market players.  
4.3.2 The relative concentration of information flows and financial reporting    
A company manages the flow of bad versus good news strategically as part of an 
overall reporting and disclosure policy. Prior literature examines the interaction between the 
                                                 
17 We repeat the analysis allowing for investor turnover to have a binary instead of a continuous effect. Similar 
to Maffett (2012) we test the effects of the highest and lowest quintiles of investor turnover assuming the 
highest (lowest) quintile represents more transient (dedicated) institutions. As expected, the effect pertains to 
the highest quintile of investor turnover (InvestorTurnoverQ5 = −0.507, t = −5.60, InvestorTurnoverQ1 = 
0.099, t = 0.43), i.e., transient–frequently-trading institutional holders. We make a similar inference when we 
repeat the analysis using the Bushee (2001) and Bushee and Noe (2000) classification of institutional investors 
into transient and non-transient types.  
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quality of mandatory reporting and of voluntary disclosures (Francis et al., 2008). A key 
argument is that since information quality is endogenous, there is a positive association 
between the quality of mandatory and voluntary disclosure. Francis et al. (2008) provide 
evidence to support this proposition. Therefore, to the extent reporting and disclosure 
choices align, we expect firms that opportunistically withhold bad news to have lower 
quality reported earnings. To examine this, we test the association between our relative 
concentration measure and earnings quality proxies.  
We use four earnings quality proxies: accruals quality (AQ); absolute abnormal 
accruals (AbsAA); earnings variability (σEarn); and a combined measure based on the 
common factor score of these metrics (EQ). Accruals quality, AQ, is based on the Dechow 
and Dichev (2002) model, extended by McNichols (2002), and measures the extent to 
which working capital accruals map into cash flows in the current, prior, and future periods 
and changes in revenues and property, plant, and equipment. The absolute value of 
abnormal accruals, AbsAA, is based on the modified Jones (1991) model. The standard 
deviation of earnings, EarnVar, correlates with various earnings quality measures, such as 
earnings smoothness, earnings predictability, poor matching of revenue and expenses, etc. 
(e.g., Francis, LaFond Olsson, and Schipper, 2004; Dichev and Tang, 2009). Higher values 
of AQ, AbsAA, and EarnVar indicate noisier reported earnings (e.g., accrual estimation 
errors, volatility). The combined measure, EQ, is the common factor score from a factor 
analysis of AQ, AbsAA, and EarnVar. EQ offers a potentially more comprehensive measure 
of earnings quality as it combines the variation of multiple earnings properties. EQ has the 
same ordering as the underlying variables, so larger values of EQ indicate lower quality 
reported earnings. We expect to find a positive association of Bad v. good flows with EQ 
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and the other earnings quality proxies. Calculating earnings quality measures reduces our 
sample from 158,915 to 84,960 firm–year observations.  
Table 5 reports the regression results. Controlling for persistence, Bad v. good flows 
is positively associated with all earnings quality proxies, exhibiting the strongest association 
with EQ (0.108, t = 3.36). Since a company’s business model and operating environment 
affects both asymmetric information flows and earnings quality, we repeat the regression 
with EQ, adding additional controls for innate business fundamentals (following Dechow 
and Dichev, 2002; Francis et al., 2004, 2005), e.g., cash flow volatility, sales volatility, 
operating cash cycle, cumulative losses, intangible assets intensity, and capital assets 
intensity. Column five reports the results. The coefficient on EQ remains positive (0.059, t 
= 2.12), mitigating concerns that the underlying business model drives the association 
between Bad v. good flows and EQ, and lending further support to the inverse association 
between discretionary earnings quality and the relative concentration of bad news flows. 
Taken together, the results in Table 5 suggest that firms with a higher concentration of bad 
relative to good news have noisier reported earnings driven by managerial discretion, 
consistent with our conjecture concerning the alignment of the firm’s disclosure and 
reporting practices.18  
4.3.3 The relative concentration of information flows and class action lawsuits   
If managers release bad news on a timely basis, they avoid large stock price drops 
upon earnings announcements that may trigger class action lawsuits (Francis et al. 1994). 
Conversely, if companies withhold bad news they face a higher probability of a lawsuit. 
                                                 
18 An alternative explanation is that the noisier properties of reported earnings drive the asymmetry in the 
relative concentration of bad news. To mitigate this concern we re-estimate equation (3) adding EQ. In this 
specification managerial incentives and constraints are significant, but not EQ (−0.072, t = −0.82).This 
suggests that managerial incentives and constraints have a first order effect in determining the relative 
concentration of information flows.  
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Therefore, to the extent our measure captures companies’ opportunistic withholding of bad 
news, we expect Bad v. good flows to be positively associated with the possibility of a class 
action lawsuit. To test this, we model the probability of a class action lawsuit (Lawsuit = 1) 
as a function of Bad v. good flows and other factors affecting the probability of litigation 
suggested by Field et al. (2005). We include, market capitalization (MtkCap), stock 
volatility (σRet), past returns ( 1tRet  ), stock turnover (Turnover), and indicator variables for 
high tech and regulated industries (HighTech, Regulated) and for negative earnings 
surprises and earnings declines (NegSurprise, NegΔEarn). Appendix A provides detailed 
definitions of the variables. Table 6 reports the logistic regression results. We use 84,960 
observations for this test, as in Table 5. As expected, the probability of lawsuit increases 
with stock volatility, lower past returns, and stock turnover, and is higher in high tech 
industries and companies reporting negative earnings surprises or earnings declines. Firms 
with a greater relative concentration of bad news flows are also more likely to be sued, 
evidenced by the positive coefficient on Bad v. good flows (0.150, t = 7.18). As lower 
earnings quality can trigger litigation and is positively associated with the relative 
concentration of bad news flows, we add EQ in the next column. The coefficient on Bad v. 
good flows remains positive (0.153, t = 7.23), despite the positive loading of EQ (0.205, t = 
3.51). Therefore, the documented association between Bad v. good flows and the probability 
of lawsuit is robust to the effect of earnings quality. The final column of table 6 reports the 
results of repeating the logistic regression adding all remaining determinants of Bad v. good 
flows. The coefficient on Bad v. good flows remains positive (0.139, t = 5.67). Collectively, 
the results in table 6 suggest that the relative concentration of bad news can trigger class 
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action lawsuits. This association is robust to other factors affecting the risk of litigation. We 
view these results as lending further credence to our relative concentration measure.  
 
5. Additional analysis  
5.1 The relative concentration of bad news and CEO succession 
To further assess whether our measure of the relative concentration of bad versus 
good news flows reflects the strategic withholding of bad news, we investigate changes of 
Bad v. good flows associated with changes in a company’s CEO. To the extent that strategic 
withholding of bad news is part of a corporate disclosure and reporting policy determined 
by the CEO, we expect CEO succession to cause a structural shift in the practice. Given the 
opportunistic nature of the practice and evidence on the association of CEO turnover with 
poor performance in the period leading up to successions (Kaplan and Minton 2012) as well 
as evidence of higher intensity of management discipline following successions (Parrino et 
al., 2003; Farrel and Whidbee, 2000), we expect a decline in the strategic withholding of bad 
news after CEO successions.19 We start by identifying CEO successions within our sample 
and isolating the four years surrounding each succession (similar to Parrino et al., 2003) 
having each firm serve as its own control. This yields 9,270 firm–year observations with 
available accounting and stock market data.  We then test the change in Bad v. good flows 
in the two post-succession years compared to the two pre-succession years, adding a 
NewCEO indictor to equation 3. Table 7 reports the results. The coefficient on NewCEO is 
negative (−0.304, t = −5.40), indicating that the relative concentration of bad versus good 
                                                 
19 Kaplan and Minton (2012) find CEO turnover is significantly related to firm performance for both forced 
and unforced turnover. Our specification (equation 3) already includes multiple factors associated with CEO 
turnover, e.g. stock price volatility, negative operating performance, sales growth, mitigating concerns about 
the endogeneity of CEO turnover in our tests.  
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news flows is on average 30% lower in the two years after the CEO succession. Using 
NewCEOYear1 and NewCEOYear2 to identify the first and second post-succession years, 
column (2) shows that the decline is sustained in the second year of succession (25%), 
consistent with a change in the company’s communication strategy rather than just an 
intertemporal shift in disclosure. The results in Table 7 show that our measure reflects 
corporate disclosure policies and offers insights into changes in disclosure policies 
following top management changes.  
5.2 The relative concentration of bad news around firm disclosures    
To further assess whether firm disclosures drive our measure of the relative 
concentration of bad versus good news flows, we re-calculate our measure retaining only 
trading days adjacent to firm disclosures. We focus on earnings announcement dates of 
annual and quarterly earnings and on dates of filings of 10-Ks (annual financials), 10-Qs 
(quarterly financials) and of 8-Ks (current events) to the SEC.20 We obtain the earnings 
announcement dates from I/B/E/S and the SEC filing dates from SEC analytics (the latter 
covering the period post-2009). Initial analysis of the filing dates shows that the average 
firm files ten 8-Ks during the fiscal year, yielding an average of fifteen filings per year 
(including the annual and quarterly financials). We obtain stock returns for the three day 
window [–1, 1] around the earnings announcement or filing and recalculate Bad v. good 
flows using only these dates in each firm–year combination. To maximize the number of 
usable observations given the shorter sample period for this additional test (2009–2012) we 
                                                 
20 The SEC requires US firms to file 8-K forms for a list of important corporate events (e.g. entry into or 
termination of a definitive agreement, acquisition of assets, material impairments, notice of delisting or 
bankruptcy, changes in corporate governance, changes in fiscal year end, suspension of trading) within 
(usually) four business days after the occurrence of the event triggering the disclosure.    
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repeat the analysis using the larger sample with available accounting and stock market data.  
This yields 13,432 firm–year observations.   
Table 8, panel A reports descriptive statistics on the re-calculated measure of Bad v. 
good flows. Mean and median Bad v. good flows are negative (−0.292, −0.309), as in Table 
1, but the standard deviation increases 4.5-fold to 13 days. The difference in the distribution 
of the re-calculated measure is also evident in the conditional analysis, where Bad v. good 
flows is positive for 48% of observations. In this subsample bad news flows are 
concentrated in 12 days compared to 20 days for good news flows. This eight day difference 
indicates a substantially higher relative concentration of bad versus good news within this 
subsample. Table 8, panel B reports the regression results for the re-calculated Bad v. good 
flows on all business environment variables, all variables proxying for managerial 
incentives unrelated to executive compensation and constraints related to firm size and 
litigation risk. Bad v. good flows varies with three managerial incentives, increasing with 
reporting of earnings declines and losses, as in Table 4, and decreasing with operating 
performance. Also, as in Table 4, Bad v. good flows is inversely associated with market 
capitalization and with high legal exposure industries. This evidence reaffirms poor 
operating performance as a key motive to withhold bad news, and firm size and litigation 
risk as constraints.  
5.3 The relative concentration of information flows—filtering out systematic variation 
Given our measure is based on stock returns, it could reflect an asymmetry in the market’s 
transmission speed of good versus bad news. Alternatively it could reflect an asymmetry in 
the market response to bad versus good news driven by investor sentiment or 
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overconfidence.21 We perform an additional test to remove variation in our measure driven 
by systematic market- or industry-wide factors and focus on the idiosyncratic (firm-specific) 
element. We adjust Bad v. good flows for each firm–year combination with the mean value 
of Bad v. good flows for all remaining firms operating in the same Fama and French (1997) 
industry group as the sample firm. We find (results not tabulated) that both mean and 
median adjusted Bad v. good flows are positive (0.031, 0.175), with a standard deviation of 
almost 2.5 days. Adjusted Bad v. good flows is positive in 53% of firms–years in the sample, 
indicating cases where bad news is more concentrated than good news. Repeating the 
regression analysis, the adjusted Bad v. good flows exhibits similar associations with the 
business environment variables, managerial incentives, and constraints as the unadjusted 
measure (Table 4). We also test an additional adjustment of our measure that focuses on the 
concentration of bad flows. We adjust Bad flows for each firm–year combination with mean 
Bad flows of all remaining firms exhibiting similar good flows concentration (i.e., operating 
in the same Good flows decile each year). We confirm that adjusted Bad flows exhibit 
similar associations with the business environment variables, managerial incentives, and 
constraints as Bad v. good flows in Table 4. These additional results mitigate concerns that 
systematic market- or industry-wide asymmetries in the flows of good versus bad news 
drive the variation in our measure of the relative concentration of bad news. 
5.4 The relative concentration of bad versus good news in changing regimes of corporate 
governance  
 Changes in governance or disclosure regulation over time can affect managers’ 
scope and incentives to withhold bad news. Our sample period spans several years with 
                                                 
21 Several theoretical models predict an asymmetric market response to bad versus good news that might be 
attributed to investor sentiment or overconfidence (e.g. Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1998, Daniel, Hirsleifer, 
and Subramanyam, 1998). 
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changes in regimes of corporate governance or disclosure. Investigating the impact of these 
changes could shed light on the governance mechanisms that constrain opportunistic 
withholding of bad news, while offering further construct validity to our measure of the 
relative concentration of bad versus good news as a measure of the quality of the firm’s 
information environment.   
We investigate two regulatory shifts during our sample period. The first is the 
passage of antitakeover laws in the US in the mid-1980s, which constituted an important 
change in firms’ corporate governance structures that could have affected managerial 
incentives to withhold bad news. The second-generation statement antitakeover laws 
affected firms incorporated in different US states at different times from 1985 to 1991 (see 
appendix B). The laws ensured an increase in antitakeover provisions that reduced the threat 
of a hostile takeover and insulated managers from the pressure of the market for corporate 
control. Given that hostile takeovers are often associated with poor operating performance 
and financial distress, such provisions may have reduced the pressure to withhold bad news. 
With an increase in antitakeover provisions, managers may feel also more secure about their 
labor market prospects and therefore become less concerned about concealing poor 
performance. This change in antitakeover protection is therefore likely to have reduced 
managerial incentives to withhold bad news. To test this prediction, we re-estimate equation 
(3) adding an indicator of firms incorporated in a state that passed an antitakeover law 
(Antitakeover) and interaction terms with the factors determining Bad v. good flows. The 
staggered enactment of the antitakeover laws across US states allows identification in this 
case of the causal effect of a change in corporate governance on a firm’s disclosure policy; 
the states where the laws were not passed provide control firms for the treatment firms in 
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states that passed the laws.  We run this part of the analysis over the period 1985–1995.  
The first two columns of Table 9 report the results. The coefficient on Antitakeover is 
insignificant at conventional levels (−0.016, t = −0.38). Including interaction terms, 
however, the coefficients on Antitakeover × NegEarn and Antitakeover × Debt/Assets are 
negative (−0.249, t = −2.45 and −0.241, t = −2.00), suggesting that losses and financial 
distress are less likely drive the relative concentration of bad versus good news after the 
passage of the antitakeover laws. This is consistent with managers of loss making and 
financially distressed firms feeling less pressure to withhold bad news following the 
enactment of antitakeover protection.  
The second regulatory shift that we consider is the enactment of SEC regulations 
during the 2000s. Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD), enacted in October 2000, prohibited 
firms’ selective private disclosures, likely constraining managers’ ability to regulate the 
flow of news within the financial year before formal public disclosures. The SEC also 
issued additional requirements for Form 8-K reporting in mid-2004 to expand considerably 
the number of current events reportable in 8-Ks and shorten the filing deadline to accelerate 
firms’ information flows within the financial year (see footnote 13). These changes aimed to 
improve the timeliness of the disclosure of important corporate events, arguably 
constraining the opportunity to withhold news flows from investors. To test the effect of 
these two pieces of regulation, we re-estimate equation (3) adding an indicator of fiscal 
periods ending on or after October 2000 (SEC REG FD) and an indicator of fiscal periods 
ending on or after August 2004 (SEC REG 8K). We conduct this part of the analysis on the 
period 1996–2006. The third column of Table 9 reports the results. While the coefficient on 
SEC REG FD is not significant at conventional levels (−0.096, t = −0.90), the coefficient on  
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SEC REG 8K is negative and highly significant (−0.265, t = −7.54), indicating a substantial 
decline in the relative concentration of bad news following the 2004 8-K requirements. As 
the significant structural shift in our measure appears after the 8-K requirements, we repeat 
the analysis adding interactions between (SEC REG 8K) and the determinants of Bad v. 
good flows. The last column of Table 9 reports the results. The coefficients on SEC REG 8K 
× HighTechInd, SEC REG 8K × Debt/Assets and SEC REG 8K × MktCap are negative and 
significant (−0.150, t = −2.66, −0.658, t = −5.61, and −0.826, t = −1.79 respectively), 
suggesting that high tech, financially distressed, and larger firms are more constrained from 
increasing the relative concentration of bad relative to good news following the 2004 8-K 
requirements.  This is consistent with SEC’s 8-K requirements constraining the opportunity 
to withhold bad news.  
The results in Table 9 offer evidence of two structural shifts in the relative 
concentration of bad versus good news over our sample period related to changes in 
corporate governance and disclosure regulation. This evidence supports the restraining 
effect of regulation on the asymmetric flows of bad versus good news, while offering 
additional construct validity to our measure.  
5.5 Analyst earnings forecasts and stock recommendations  
While earnings announcements and firm disclosures are a key source of information flows, 
sell-side analysts play an important role in price discovery. Bradley et al. (2014a) provide 
evidence that analysts’ recommendations are an important information disclosure channel.  
Bradley et al. (2014b) show that the market reacts more strongly to stock recommendation 
downgrades than upgrades, especially for contrarian revisions, i.e., recommendations that 
contradict a sizeable recent stock price movement. Given that stock recommendation 
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downgrades are much rarer than upgrades, recommendation revisions may also result in bad 
news being more concentrated than good news over the year. Our evidence so far associates 
our measure of the relative concentration of information flows with firm disclosure policy. 
We now re-calculate Bad v. good flows removing all days with a revision in an analyst 
earnings forecast or a recommendation revision. Re-estimating equation (3) using the 
recalculated measure (results not tabulated) preserves all key results of Table 4, reaffirming 
the association of Bad v. good flows with managerial incentives and constraints on 
withholding bad news.   
 6. Conclusion  
We construct a new measure of the relative concentration of bad versus good news 
flows. If managers opportunistically withhold bad news, bad news concentrates in fewer 
days in a financial year than good news, increasing the relative concentration of bad versus 
good news. Our measure is based on the flows of positive versus negative idiosyncratic 
stock returns and captures the number of days it takes for price to reflect one unit of 
negative versus one unit of positive news. We find that firms with higher operational 
volatility and incentives to delay bad news exhibit a higher relative concentration of bad 
versus good news flows, while firms with higher levels of insider ownership and 
institutional investor turnover exhibit lower relative concentration. We also find that firms 
with higher relative concentration of bad versus good news flows report earnings of lower 
quality and have a higher probability of shareholder litigation. Viewed collectively the 
evidence suggests that our measure of the relative concentration of information flows is 
directly related to the quality of the firm’s information environment.  
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Exhibit 1  
Factors affecting the relative 
concentration of bad versus good 
news flows  
  Construct  Variable name   
Business 
environment   
Operational volatility Idiosyncratic volatility   σAR 
 Uncertainty about 
future operations  
 
Membership of high-tech 
industries 
HighTech 
 Firm characteristics  Firm listing age   YrsListed 
  Sales growth rate (%)  Salesgrowth 
    
Management 
incentives  
Operating performance  
 
Reporting earnings 
declines 
NegΔEarn  
Reporting losses NegEarn 
  ROA ROA 
 Market performance  Negative over positive 
market return days 
NegMRetDays 
 Contractual 
considerations  
 
Option grants    #OptionsGrant  
 Exercisable options  #OptionsEx 
 Insider Ownership  DirStk%, DirStk%2 
   
 Corporate financing 
events  
Equity offerings  SEO 
 Debt Issues  DebtIssues 
  Financial distress   Debt/Assets 
Constraints  Competing 
information sources 
Size MktCap  
 Number of analysts 
following  
#Anal  
 Institutional 
information acquisition  
 
Investor turnover  InvestorTurnover  
 
 Shareholder litigation 
risk  
Membership of high 
legal exposure 
industries 
HighLit  
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Appendix A 
Definition of variables in alphabetical order
Variable  Description  
AbsAA  Absolute abnormal accruals based on the Jones (1991) model. 
#Anal Number of analysts following the firm. 
AQ Standard deviation of the firm’s residuals from years t−4 to t from annual cross-
sectional estimates of the modified Dechow and Dichev (2002) model, i.e., regressions 
of the firm’s year t working capital accruals on years t−1, t, and t+1 cash flows from 
operations, the year t change in revenues and the year t property, plant, and equipment 
(all variables scaled by average total assets). 
AR Excess daily stock returns measured as the intercept plus the residual from a regression 
of a firm’s daily stock returns on market returns.  
Antitakeover  Equals 1 if the firm is incorporated in a state that has passed an antitakeover law (see 
Appendix B), 0 otherwise.   
Bad v. good flows The difference between the concentration of good news (Good flows) and bad news 
(Bad flows). Bad flows is the average number of days it takes price to reflect one unit of 
negative news during year t. Good flows is the average number of days it takes price to 
reflect one unit of positive news during year t.  
BadflowsMarket The percentage of days over the firm’s fiscal year with negative market returns.  
BadMarketNews Equals 1 when the cumulative market returns over the firm’s fiscal year are negative, 0 
otherwise. 
CapIntensity Net book value of PP&E to total assets.
Debt/Assets Debt divided by total assets. 
DebtIssues Equals 1 if the company has issued long-term debt during year t (item DLTIS - Long-
Term Debt – Issuance >1), 0 otherwise.
DirStk% Percentage of stock held by executive directors. 
EarnVar  The standard deviation of the firm’s net income before extraordinary items (NIBE) 
scaled by total assets over years t−6 to t. 
EQ Common factor score obtained from a factor analysis of AQ, AbsAA, and EarnVar.  
HighLitInd Equals 1 for firms in high legal exposure industries, which are those with above-median 
lawsuit rates following Field et al. (2005). We derive the lawsuit rates using all class 
action lawsuits filed from 1996 onwards under the Securities Act of 1934. We extract 
these lawsuits from the Securities Class Action Clearinghouse (securities.stanford.edu).  
HighTechInd Equals 1 if the firm is a member of a high-tech industry. High-tech firms are firms with 
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes 2833–2836, 3570–3577, 3600–3674, 
7371–7379 and 8731–8734.  
InvestorTurnover  Weighted average of the total portfolio churn rates of the firms’ institutional investors 
over the four quarters of the year (Gaspar et al. 2005). We obtain the churn rate for each 
institutional investor and each quarter as follows 
ܥܴ௜௧ ൌ
∑ | ௝ܰ௜௧ ௝ܲ௧ െ ௝ܰ௜௧ିଵ ௝ܲ௧ିଵ െ ௝ܰ௜௧∆ ௝ܲ௧|௝∈ொ
∑ ൫ ௝ܰ௜௧ ௝ܲ௧ ൅ ௝ܰ௜௧ିଵ ௝ܲ௧ିଵ൯ 2⁄௝∈ொ  
where Pjt and Njit are the price and number of shares of company j held by institutional 
investor i at the end of quarter t. Investor turnover for the firm, which measures the 
investment horizon of institutional shareholders, is calculated as  
ܫ݊ݒ݁ݏݐ݋ݎܶݑݎ݊݋ݒ݁ݎ௞௧ ൌ ∑ ݓ௞௜௧ሺଵସ௝∈ௌ ∑ ܥܴ௜,௧ି௥ାଵሻସ௥ୀଵ , where S is the set of shareholders 
in company k and wkit is the weight of investor i in the total percentage held by 
institutional investors at the end of quarter t.  
IntIntensity The firm’s reported R&D and advertising expense as a proportion of its sales revenues. 
Lawsuit Equals 1 if there is a class action lawsuit, 0 otherwise. We extract all class action 
lawsuits filed from 1996 onwards under the Securities Act of 1934 from the Securities 
Class Action Clearinghouse website (http://securities.stanford.edu). 
Losses Proportion of losses (negative NIBE) for the firm over years t−6 to year t. 
MktCap Natural logarithm of the firm’s market capitalization divided by the natural logarithm of 
the median market capitalization by industry and year.   
NewCEO Equals 1 in the first and second CEO succession years, 0 otherwise.   
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NewCEOYear1 Equals 1 in the first CEO succession year, 0 otherwise. 
NewCEOYear2 Equals 1 in the second CEO succession year, 0 otherwise.
NegEarn Equals 1 when the firm’s NIBE is negative, 0 otherwise.  
NegΔEarn Equals 1 when the change in the firm’s NIBE from years t−1 to t is negative, 0 
otherwise.  
NegMRetDays The fraction of days in the firm’s fiscal year when the market return is negative.  
NegSurprise Equals 1 when the forecast error for year t is negative, 0 otherwise. Forecast error is the 
difference between the I/B/E/S actual EPS and the median analyst consensus forecast 
outstanding at the earnings announcement date.  
OperCycle Log of the firm’s average trade receivables period plus the average stockholding period. 
The trade receivables period is 360/(Sales/Average trade receivables) and the 
stockholding period is 360/(Cost of goods sold/average inventory). 
#OptionsExer Natural logarithm of the number of exercisable stock options held by the firm’s CEO 
during the year. 
#OptionsGranted Natural logarithm of the total number of options granted to the firm’s CEO during the 
year.  
ROA Net income before extraordinary items divided by average total assets over years t and 
t−1. 
Salesgrowth Compound annual growth rate in sales over years t−2 to year t.   
SEO Equals 1 if the firm receives funds from issuance of common or preferred stock during 
year t (SCSTKC - Sale of Common and Preferred Stock > 1), 0 otherwise.  
SEC REG(FD) Equals 1 for fiscal years ending on or after October 2000, 0 otherwise.   
SEC REG(8K)  Equals 1 for fiscal years ending on or after August 2004, 0 otherwise. 
σAR Standard deviation of daily abnormal stock returns during year t.  
σCFO Standard deviation of the firm’s cash flow from operations (scaled by average total 
assets) from years t−6 to t. 
σRet Standard deviation of daily stock returns during year t.  
σSales  Standard deviation of the firm’s sales revenues (scaled by average total assets) from 
years t−6 to t. 
Turnover  Percentage of non-zero trading days over total trading days in year t.  
YrsListed The number of years between year t and the year that the firm has its first record on the 
CRSP files.  
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Appendix B Passage of Antitakeover Laws by State (see Armstrong et al. 2012).  
State   Year of enactment of the 
law  
State   Year of enactment of the 
law  
Alabama  Montana 
Alaska   Nebraska  1988 
Arizona  1987 Nevada  1991 
Arkansas   New Hampshire   
California   New Jersey  1986 
Colorado   New Mexico   
Connecticut  1989 New York  1985 
Delaware  1988 North Carolina   
District of Columbia   North Dakota   
Florida  Ohio  1990 
Georgia  1988 Oklahoma  1991 
Hawaii   Oregon   
Idaho  1988 Pennsylvania  1989 
Illinois  1989 Rhode Island  1990 
Indiana  1986 South Carolina  1988 
Iowa   South Dakota  1990 
Kansas 1989 Tennessee  1988 
Kentucky  1987 Texas  
Louisiana   Utah   
Maine  1988 Vermont   
Maryland  1989 Virginia  1988 
Massachusetts  1989 Washington  1987 
Michigan  1989 West Virginia   
Minnesota  1987 Wisconsin  1987 
Mississippi   Wyoming  1989 
Missouri  1986   
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Table 1  
Descriptive statistics for the relative concentration of information flows  
Descriptive statistics for the relative concentration of information flows (Bad v. good flows). Bad flows
(Good flows) is the concentration of bad (good) news, i.e., the average number of days for one unit of bad 
(good) news to transmit to price. The sample with available accounting, lawsuit and stock market data from 
Compustat and CRSP consists of 158,915 firm−years observations over fiscal years 1964–2012.   
 
Panel A:Overall    
 Mean  StdDev. Q1 Median       Q3 
Bad flows 15.085 8.897 8.440 13.138 19.764 
Good flows  13.762 8.406 7.541 11.775 18.016 
Bad v. good flows −1.321 2.884 −2.671 −1.001 0.180 
Bad v. good flows > 0   0.287 0.452 0.000 0.000 1.000 
      
Panel B:Conditional analysis (Bad v. good flows > 0) 
Bad flows 14.143 8.754 2.210 48.845 14.143 
Good flows  15.774 9.528 2.101 46.578 15.774 
Bad v. good flows 1.627 1.758 0.000 8.014 1.627 
Panel C: Across Years 
 Obs Bad flows Good flows Bad v. good flows Bad v. good flows > 0
1960s 5,110 22.468 19.685 −2.796 0.192 
1970s  25,231 16.116 14.542 −1.565 0.254 
1980s 34,986 15.441 13.660 −1.770 0.254 
1990s 43,717 12.941 11.952 −0.989 0.300 
2000−2012 49,871 15.578 14.594 −0.987 0.331 
    
1999 4,823 10.855 9.610 −1.254 0.208 
2000 4,578 9.398 8.546 −0.855 0.260 
2001 4,423 10.492 10.147 −0.350 0.361 
2002 4,404 11.423 11.302 −0.127 0.441 
2003 4,163 15.468 14.115 −1.363 0.248 
2004 4,030 18.115 16.838 −1.289 0.311 
2005 3,842 19.354 17.930 −1.412 0.318 
2006 3,784 19.757 18.240 −1.518 0.309 
2007 3,635 18.489 17.066 −1.455 0.321 
2008 3,574 11.019 11.006 −0.015 0.482 
2009 3,551 12.987 11.910 −1.081 0.259 
2010 3,398 19.969 18.464 −1.501 0.292 
2011 3,286 19.470 18.378 −1.124 0.347 
2012 3,204 20.636 19.594 −1.008 0.367 
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Table 1(cont’d)  
Panel D: Across Fama and French’s (1997) 48 industry groups 
Industry Name FFSIC N Bad v. good flows > 0 Good flows Bad flows 
Communication 32 7,529 0.370 25.456 26.671 
Tobacco Products 5 263 0.359 23.140 24.550 
Real Estate 46 1,280 0.343 14.579 15.643 
Beer & Liquor 4 658 0.324 20.305 21.832 
Business Services 34 1,492 0.323 12.787 13.894 
Healthcare 11 2,393 0.307 10.995 11.910 
Restaurants, Hotels, 
Motels 
43 
9,610 0.306 13.967 15.228 
Transportation 40 709 0.305 17.723 19.302 
Electronic 
Equipment 
36 
6,266 0.301 10.429 11.329 
Chemicals 14 3,815 0.300 17.342 18.876 
Textiles 16 1,584 0.300 13.700 15.142 
Retail 42 6,720 0.299 12.624 13.855 
Aircraft 24 3,080 0.297 15.394 16.802 
Shipping Containers 39 2,982 0.292 17.052 18.600 
Banking 44 3,116 0.290 12.541 13.850 
Printing and 
Publishing 
8 
1,588 0.289 16.624 18.275 
Wholesale 41 6,833 0.288 13.968 15.391 
Agriculture 1 4,724 0.287 14.823 16.239 
Machinery 21 8,292 0.287 13.397 14.640 
Consumer Goods 9 627 0.287 13.769 15.363 
Utilities 31 3,675 0.287 14.554 16.003 
Petroleum and 
Natural Gas 
30 
1,063 0.286 14.943 16.548 
Computers 35 14,666 0.285 11.149 12.269 
Apparel 10 306 0.284 13.268 14.527 
Almost Nothing 48 551 0.283 12.064 13.248 
Insurance 45 2,161 0.283 13.123 14.498 
Business Supplies 38 3,023 0.282 13.028 14.457 
Food Products 2 3,904 0.281 11.684 12.889 
Construction 
Materials 
17 
3,697 0.278 17.226 18.925 
Coal 29 4,851 0.277 14.939 16.557 
Automobiles and 
Trucks 
23 
1,825 0.275 9.982 11.176 
Personal Services 33 831 0.274 11.290 12.834 
Fabricated Products 20 1,142 0.274 10.034 11.046 
Recreation 6 4,750 0.274 15.902 17.479 
Defense 26 1,731 0.274 11.326 12.598 
Medical Equipment 12 416 0.272 14.108 15.849 
Non−Metallic and 28 4,620 0.271 11.148 12.259 
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Industrial Metal 
Steel Works Etc 19 3,214 0.266 14.558 16.084 
Measuring and 
Control Equipment 
37 
9,943 0.266 10.910 12.106 
Rubber and Plastic 
Products 
15 
2,073 0.265 12.762 14.287 
Construction 18 7,128 0.261 11.727 12.942 
Pharmaceutical 
Products 
13 
1,393 0.260 11.960 13.366 
Candy & Soda 3 457 0.256 15.612 17.383 
Electrical Equipment 22 3,021 0.253 13.527 15.145 
Trading 47 372 0.237 16.798 18.986 
Precious Metals 27 1,191 0.236 15.801 17.775 
Shipbuilding, 
Railroad Equipment 
25 
1,105 0.235 10.571 12.177 
Entertainment 7 2,245 0.228 11.895 13.644 
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Table 2 
Descriptive statistics of key variables 
The sample with available accounting, lawsuit and stock market data from Compustat and CRSP consists of 158,915 firm–
year observations over fiscal years 1964–2012. Adding analyst forecast data from I/B/E/S, compensation data from 
ExecuComp, and institutional ownership data from Thomson Reuters reduces the final sample to 24,929 observations over
1992–2012. Appendix A defines all variables. 
 Obs.  Mean  StdDev. Q1 Median Q3 
σAR 158,915 0.034 0.023 0.019 0.028 0.042 
HighTechInd 158,915 0.184 0.388 0.000 0.000 0.000 
YrsListed 158,915 13.088 11.003 5.000 9.000 18.000 
Salesgrowth 158,915 0.155 0.409 −0.001 0.094 0.214 
NegΔEarn  158,915 0.404 0.491 0.000 0.000 1.000 
NegEarn 158,915 0.273 0.445 0.000 0.000 1.000 
ROA 158,915 −0.004 0.190 −0.011 0.040 0.080 
NegMRetDays 158,915 0.466 0.042 0.440 0.456 0.488 
SEO 158,915 0.024 0.152 0.000 0.000 0.000 
DebtIssues 158,915 0.451 0.498 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Debt/Assets 158,915 0.243 0.204 0.067 0.221 0.366 
MktCap  158,915 1.047 0.471 0.726 1.014 1.322 
HighLitInd  158,915 0.192 0.394 0.000 0.000 0.000 
       
#OptionsGranted  15,240 3.016 1.778 2.093 3.421 4.283 
#OptionsExer 15,240 4.365 1.663 3.616 4.587 5.468 
DirStk% 15,240 0.035 0.072 0.002 0.007 0.027 
DirStk%2 15,240 0.007 0.031 0.000 0.000 0.001 
#Anal  15,240 12.434 9.014 6.000 10.000 17.000 
InvestorTurnover 15,240 0.305 0.050 0.270 0.304 0.339 
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Table 3 
Key variables: conditional analysis  
The distribution of key variables between firms with positive asymmetry in the dispersion of bad 
versus good news (Bad v. good flows >0) and remaining firms. The sample with available accounting, 
lawsuit and stock market data from Compustat and CRSP consists of 158,915 firm–year observations 
over fiscal years 1964–2012. Adding analyst forecast data from I/B/E/S, compensation data from 
ExecuComp and institutional ownership data from Thomson Reuters reduces the final sample to 
24,929 observations over 1992–2012. Appendix A defines all variables. 
Mean  Bad v. good flows >0 Bad v. good flows ≤0 Diff.  z−value 
Bad v. good flows 1.627 −2.509 4.135 312.41 
Good flows 14.143 15.465 −1.322 53.39 
Bad flows 15.774 12.951 2.823 −30.66 
σAR 0.033 0.035 −0.001 −16.44 
HighTechInd 0.177 0.187 −0.010 −4.86 
YrsListed 13.429 12.951 0.478 1.72 
Salesgrowth 0.145 0.159 −0.014 −4.10 
NegΔEarn  0.500 0.366 0.135 49.51 
NegEarn 0.293 0.264 0.029 11.64 
ROA  −0.005 −0.003 −0.002 −12.35 
NegMRetDays  0.470 0.464 0.005 21.45 
SEO 0.034 0.019 0.015 17.80 
DebtIssues 0.471 0.443 0.028 10.19 
Debt/Assets 0.246 0.242 0.004 3.59 
MktCap  1.042 1.050 −0.008 −1.23 
HighLitInd 0.200 0.188 0.011 5.24 
Obs               45,642            113,273  
    
#OptionsGranted  2.998 3.025 −0.027 −0.62 
#OptionsExer 4.391 4.351 0.041 1.96 
DirStk% 0.032 0.036 −0.004 −2.27 
DirStk%2 0.006 0.007 −0.001 −2.27 
#Anal  12.692 12.294 0.399 4.34 
InvestorTurnover  0.303 0.306 −0.003 −3.40 
Obs 5,381 9,859  
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Table 4 Determinants of the relative concentration of bad versus good news (Bad v. good flows) 
Results of regressing Bad v. good flows on factors related to the firm’s business environment, management
incentives, and constraints (Exhibit 1). The sample with available accounting, lawsuit and stock market
data from Compustat and CRSP consists of 158,915 firm−years over fiscal years 1964–2012. Adding 
analyst forecast data from I/B/E/S, compensation data from ExecuComp and institutional ownership data 
from Thomson Reuters reduces the final sample to 24,929 observations over 1992–2012. Appendix A
defines all variables. */**/*** indicate significance at 0.1/0.05/0.01 levels (two-tailed). t-statistics in 
parentheses are based on robust standard errors clustered by firm and year to control for cross-sectional 
dependence and heteroskedastic and autocorrelated residuals. 
  (1) (2) (2) 
Variables Pred. 
Sign 
Bad v. good flows Bad v. good flows Bad v. good flows 
Constant −7.118*** −7.025*** −2.066 
 (−13.72) (−12.74) (−0.97) 
Bad v. good flowst−1 +  0.107*** 0.004 
 (10.19) (0.53) 
Business environment    
σAR + 9.621*** 8.274*** 28.249*** 
 (5.20) (4.83) (4.03) 
HighTechInd + 0.047 0.047 −0.091 
 (1.34) (1.38) (−1.06) 
YrsListed − −0.007** −0.006** −0.005 
 (−2.44) (−2.29) (−1.58) 
Salesgrowth + 0.064*** 0.093*** 1.050*** 
 (3.14) (4.59) (7.39) 
Managerial incentives    
NegΔEarn  + 0.792*** 0.778*** 1.217*** 
 (20.49) (20.28) (7.81) 
NegEarn + 0.171*** 0.150*** −0.001 
 (3.93) (3.71) (−0.00) 
ROA +/− 0.632*** 0.591*** 2.101*** 
 (10.30) (10.04) (4.05) 
NegMRetDays + 8.554*** 9.166*** 4.621 
 (7.16) (7.16) (1.13) 
#OptionsGranted  −   −0.044* 
   (−1.96) 
#OptionsExer +   0.006 
   (0.32) 
DirStk% −   −2.054*** 
   (−2.94) 
DirStk%2 +   2.346*** 
   (2.77) 
SEO + 0.898*** 0.812*** 0.121 
 (3.68) (3.48) (0.33) 
DebtIssues + 0.084*** 0.084*** 0.151** 
 (3.48) (3.63) (2.24) 
Debt/Assets + −0.001 −0.013 −0.201 
 (−0.02) (−0.19) (−0.96) 
Constraints     
MktCap  − −0.228** −0.215** −1.230*** 
 (−2.36) (−2.37) (−3.44) 
#Anal  +   0.031*** 
   (3.62) 
InvestorTurnover −   −5.910*** 
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   (−5.10) 
HighLitInd − −0.007 −0.003 0.125 
 (−0.13) (−0.05) (1.32) 
Annual Dummies   Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations  158,915 158,915 15,240 
Adj. R−squared  0.0847 0.0945 0. 774 
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 Table 5 The relative concentration of bad versus good news and earnings quality 
Results of regressing Bad v. good flows on earnings quality, management incentives and constraints (see Exhibit 
1). The sample consists of 158,915 observations over 1992–2012 with available accounting, lawsuit and stock 
market data from Compustat and CRSP. Calculating the earnings quality measure (EQ) reduces usable 
observations to 84,960 observations. Appendix A defines all variables. */**/*** indicate significance at 
0.1/0.05/0.01 levels (two-tailed). t-statistics in parentheses are based on robust standard errors clustered by firm 
and year to control for cross-sectional dependence and heteroskedastic and autocorrelated residuals. 
 Pred. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables Sign Coef 
(t-stat) 
Coef 
(t-stat) 
Coef 
(t-stat) 
Coef 
(t-stat) 
Coef 
(t-stat) 
Constant  −3.538*** −3.560*** −3.562*** −3.556*** −3.996*** 
  (−138.45) (−132.27) (−137.65) (−139.43) (−14.67) 
Bad v. good flowst−1 + 0.097*** 0.098*** 0.098*** 0.097*** 0.095*** 
  (8.67) (8.68) (8.67) (8.66) (8.52) 
EQ + 0.108***    0.059** 
  (3.36)    (2.12) 
AQ +  1.291**    
   (1.96)    
AbsAA +   0.562*   
    (1.87)   
σEarn +    0.876***  
     (2.82)  
IntIntensity      −1.323* 
      (−1.90) 
CapIntensity      0.485*** 
      (3.47) 
OperCycle      0.128*** 
      (3.45) 
σCFO      0.394 
      (1.37) 
σSales      0.311*** 
      (2.77) 
Losses      0.130 
      (1.49) 
Annual Dummies   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Observations  84,960 84,960 84,960 84,960 84,960 
Adj. R-squared  0.0478 0.0475 0.0474 0.0477 0.0489 
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Table 6 The relative concentration of bad versus good news and class action lawsuits 
Results from logistic regressions of the probability that a firm is sued in a class action lawsuit (LAWSUIT = 1) as 
a function of the relative concentration of information flows (Bad v. good flows) and other factors associated with 
the probability of litigation (see Field, Lowry, and Shu, 2005). The sample consists of 158,915 observations over 
1992–2012 with available accounting, lawsuit and stock market data from Compustat and CRSP. Calculating the 
earnings quality measure (EQ) reduces usable observations to 84,960 observations. Appendix A defines all 
variables. */**/*** indicate significance at 0.1/0.05/0.01 levels (two-tailed). t-statistics in parentheses are based 
on robust standard errors clustered by firm and year to control for cross-sectional dependence and heteroskedastic 
and autocorrelated residuals. 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Variable 
Pred. 
Sign 
Coef 
(t-stat) 
Coef 
(t-stat) 
Coef 
(t-stat) 
Constant  −27.288*** −27.555*** −10.845** 
  (−8.64) (−8.73) (−2.02) 
Bad v. good flows + 0.150*** 0.153*** 0.139*** 
  (7.18) (7.23) (5.67) 
MktCap + 0.635*** 0.704*** 1.423*** 
  (3.78) (4.22) (3.97) 
σRet + 17.957*** 16.736*** 47.205*** 
  (3.98) (3.21) (3.35) 
Rett−1 − −0.289** −0.296** −0.409*** 
  (−2.18) (−2.25) (−2.70) 
Turnover + 21.841*** 22.095*** 2.914 
  (6.88) (6.94) (0.97) 
HighTechInd + 0.569*** 0.507*** −0.416*** 
  (6.43) (5.79) (−3.30) 
Regulated  + 0.509 0.549 0.330 
  (1.51) (1.62) (0.70) 
NegSurprise + 0.458*** 0.465*** 0.220 
  (4.36) (4.39) (1.53) 
NegΔEarn  + 0.418*** 0.413*** 0.547*** 
  (5.44) (5.50) (4.07) 
EQ +  0.205*** 0.041 
   (3.51) (0.22) 
YrsListed    0.006 
    (0.87) 
Salesgrowth     0.477 
    (1.00) 
NegEarn     −0.076 
    (−0.21) 
ROA    0.490 
    (0.39) 
NegMRetDays    −1.124 
    (−0.14) 
#OptionsGranted     0.015 
    (0.33) 
#OptionsExer    0.027 
    (0.47) 
DirStk%    −1.335 
    (−0.42) 
DirStk%2    −1.014 
    (−0.10) 
SEO    0.755** 
    (2.26) 
DebtIssues    −0.122 
    (−1.09) 
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Debt/Assets    0.514 
   (1.34) 
#Anal     0.031*** 
    (2.61) 
InvestorTurnover    −1.865 
    (−0.92) 
HighLitInd    1.582*** 
    (9.18) 
Annual dummies   NO NO Yes 
Observations  84,960 84,960 11,523 
Likehihood Ratio   −844.91   −659.16 −570.16 
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Table 7 The relative concentration of bad versus good news around CEO successions   
Results of regressing Bad v. good flows on factors related to the firm’s business environment, 
management incentives, and constraints (Exhibit 1) over the four years around CEO successions, with
indicators of the post−succession period (NewCEO, NewCEOYear1, NewCEOYear2). The sample 
comprises 9,270 firm–year observations over the four years around the CEO succession for 1,703 
firms undergoing CEO succession within our sample period. The original sample consists of 158,915
observations over 1992–2012 with available accounting, lawsuit and stock market data from 
Compustat and CRSP. NewCEO equals 1 in the first and second year of the CEO succession, 0
otherwise.  NewCEOYear1 equals 1 in the first year of the CEO succession, 0 otherwise.
NewCEOYear2 equals 1 in the second year of the CEO succession, 0 otherwise. Appendix A defines
all variables. */**/*** indicate significance at 0.1/0.05/0.01 levels (two-tailed). t-statistics in 
parentheses are based on robust standard errors clustered by firm and year to control for cross-
sectional dependence and heteroskedastic and autocorrelated residuals. 
  (1) (2)  
Variables Pred. Sign Bad v. good flows 
Coef./(t-stat)  
Bad v. good flows 
Coef./(t-stat) 
Constant  −1.683 −1.640 
  (−0.79) (−0.76) 
Bad v. good flowst−1 + 0.046*** 0.045** 
 (2.66) (2.49) 
NewCEO − −0.304***  
  (−5.40)  
NewCEOYear1 −  −0.301*** 
   (−4.95) 
NewCEOYear2 −  −0.250*** 
   (−3.32) 
σAR + 13.171** 13.315** 
  (2.50) (2.53) 
HighTechInd + 0.038 0.040 
  (0.50) (0.53) 
YrsListed − −0.001 −0.001 
  (−0.18) (−0.21) 
Salesgrowth + 0.919*** 0.917*** 
  (5.44) (5.45) 
NegΔEarn  + 1.095*** 1.096*** 
  (8.08) (8.07) 
NegEarn + 0.116 0.119 
  (1.21) (1.24) 
ROA +/− 1.409*** 1.413*** 
  (6.32) (6.32) 
NegMRetDays + 2.342 2.252 
  (0.51) (0.49) 
SEO + −0.001 −0.001 
  (−0.01) (−0.01) 
DebtIssues + 2.342 2.252 
  (0.51) (0.49) 
Debt/Assets + −0.021 −0.022 
  (−0.07) (−0.07) 
MktCap  − 0.297*** 0.298*** 
  (2.97) (2.97) 
HighLitInd − −0.001 −0.001 
  (−0.01) (−0.01) 
Annual Dummies   Yes Yes 
Observations  9,270 9,270 
Adj. R-squared  0.0786 0.0786 
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Panel B: Regression results  
Variables Pred. sign Bad v. good flows 
Coef(t-stat) 
Constant  3.096 
  (0.75) 
σAR + −5.264 
  (−1.33) 
HighTechInd + 0.361 
  (1.36) 
YrsListed − 0.010 
  (1.19) 
Salesgrowth + −0.031 
  (−0.09) 
NegΔEarn  + 2.469*** 
  (7.17) 
NegEarn + 0.626*** 
  (3.38) 
ROA +/− −2.302* 
  (−1.75) 
NegMRetDays + −6.450 
  (−0.78) 
SEO + 1.345 
  (0.92) 
DebtIssues + 0.408 
  (1.09) 
Debt/Assets + −0.607 
  (−1.51) 
MktCap  − −1.540*** 
  (−4.34) 
HighLitInd − −0.339* 
  (−1.70) 
Annual dummies   Yes 
Observations  13,432 
Adj. R-squared  0.0175 
 
Table 8 The  relative concentration of bad versus good news around firm disclosures 
Descriptive statistics and results of regressing Bad v. good flows on factors related to the firm’s business 
environment, management incentives, and constraints (Exhibit 1). The calculation of  Bad v. good flows 
uses trading days adjacent to earnings announcements (annual and quarterly) and filings to the SEC (10K,
10Q, 8K). The sample consists of 13,432 observations over 1999–2012 with available accounting, lawsuit 
and stock market data from Compustat and CRSP. Appendix A defines all variables. */**/*** indicate 
significance at 0.1/0.05/0.01 levels (two-tailed). t-statistics in parentheses are based on robust standard 
errors clustered by firm and year to control for cross-sectional dependence and heteroskedastic and 
autocorrelated residuals. 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics   
 Mean  StdDev. Q1 Median       Q3 
Bad flows 16.198 12.869 7.961 12.479 20.203 
Good flows  15.873 12.631 8.059 12.267 19.313 
Bad v. good flows −0.292 12.963 −5.141 −0.309 4.388 
Bad v. good flows >0   0.481 0.500 0.000 0.000 1.000 
      
Conditional analysis (Good v. bad flows >0) 
Bad flows 11.859 8.750 6.183 9.422 14.686 
Good flows  19.838 14.866 10.409 15.426 24.099 
Bad v. good flows 8.031 10.680 1.963 4.624 9.645 
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Table 9 The relative concentration of bad versus good news and regulatory shifts  
Results of regressing Bad v. good flows on factors related to the firm’s business environment, management incentives, and constraints (Exhibit 1)
including indicators of regulatory shifts (state antitakeover laws, Regulation FD, SEC ruling on 8K firms) and interaction terms. Antitakeover
equals 1 if the firm is incorporated in a state that has passed an antitakeover law (see Appendix B), 0 otherwise.  SEC REG FD equals 1 for fiscal 
years ending on or after October 2000, 0 otherwise. SEC REG 8K equals 1 for fiscal years ending on or after August 2004, 0 otherwise. The original 
sample consists of 158,915 observations over 1992–2012 with available accounting, lawsuit and stock market data from Compustat and CRSP. The 
state antitakeover laws test covers the period 1985–1995 (66,860 observations). The SEC regulations (Reg FD and 8Ks) test covers the period 
1996–2006 (48,164 observations). Appendix A defines all remaining variables. */**/*** indicate significance at 0.1/0.05/0.01 levels (two-tailed). t-
statistics in parentheses are based on robust standard errors clustered by firm and year to control for cross-sectional dependence and heteroskedastic 
and autocorrelated residuals. 
  
Variables Pred. sign State antitakeover laws SEC regulation (FD & 8K forms)
 Sample period:1985–1995 Sample period:1996–2006
Constant  −3.478*** −2.936*** Constant  −4.789***  
  (−4.08) (−3.51)   (−3.92)  
Antitakeover − −0.016 −0.238 SEC REG FD   − −0.096 −0.099 
  (−0.38) (−0.47)   (−0.90) (−0.93) 
    SEC REG 8K   − −0.265***  
      (−7.54)  
Antitakeover × 
σAR 
  0.252 SEC REG 8K ×   
σAR 
  −4.065 
  (0.10)   (−0.55) 
Antitakeover × 
HighTechInd 
  −0.069 SEC REG 8K × 
HighTechInd 
  −0.150***
  (−0.97)   (−2.66) 
Antitakeover × 
YrsListed 
  0.005 SEC REG 8K × 
YrsListed 
  0.003 
  (1.05)   (0.57) 
Antitakeover × 
Salesgrowth 
  0.066* SEC REG 8K× 
Salesgrowth 
  0.054 
  (1.73)   (0.69) 
Antitakeover × 
NegΔEarn  
 0.003 SEC REG 8K × 
NegΔEarn  
0.428***
  (0.04)   (4.80) 
Antitakeover × 
NegEarn 
  −0.249** SEC REG 8K × 
NegEarn 
  0.117 
  (−2.45)   (1.30) 
Antitakeover × 
ROA 
  0.078 SEC REG 8K × 
ROA 
  0.181 
  (0.67)   (0.48) 
Antitakeover × 
NegMRetDays 
  0.877 SEC REG 8K × 
NegMRetDays 
  0.112 
  (0.64)   (0.13) 
Antitakeover × 
SEO 
  −0.413 SEC REG 8K × 
SEO 
  0.079 
  (−0.87)   (0.87) 
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Antitakeover × 
DebtIssues 
  0.022 SEC REG 8K × 
DebtIssues 
  0.117 
  (0.42)   (1.30) 
Antitakeover × 
Debt/Assets 
  −0.241** SEC REG 8K × 
Debt/Assets 
  −0.658***
  (−2.00)   (−5.61) 
Antitakeover × 
MktCap  
  −0.090 SEC REG 8K × 
MktCap  
  −0.826* 
  (−0.68)   (−1.79) 
Antitakeover × 
HighLitInd 
  −0.018 SEC REG 8K × 
HighLitInd 
  −0.082 
  (−0.22)   (−0.47) 
σAR + 8.945*** 8.788*** σAR   6.900***
  (4.91) (3.35)    (2.85) 
HighTechInd + 0.024 0.073 HighTechInd   0.022 
  (0.54) (1.16)    (0.39) 
YrsListed − −0.019*** −0.022*** YrsListed   −0.006* 
  (−5.35) (−4.72)    (−1.79) 
Salesgrowth + 0.029 −0.012 Salesgrowth   0.089***
  (1.12) (−0.29)    (3.11) 
NegΔEarn  + 0.635*** 0.635*** NegΔEarn    0.657***
  (14.92) (10.01)    (8.27) 
NegEarn + 0.105* 0.270** NegEarn   −0.033 
  (1.75) (2.56)    (−1.24) 
ROA +/− 0.673*** 0.609*** ROA   0.634***
  (9.08) (5.78)    (11.09) 
NegMRetDays + 5.858*** 5.395** NegMRetDays   8.155***
  (2.96) (2.53)    (2.81) 
SEO + 0.728** 0.992** SEO   0.017 
  (2.04) (2.18)    (0.05) 
DebtIssues + 0.047 0.036 DebtIssues   0.086** 
  (1.49) (0.66)    (2.14) 
Debt/Assets + −0.158** 0.003 Debt/Assets   0.017 
  (−2.13) (0.03)    (0.23) 
MktCap  − −0.552*** −0.489*** MktCap    −0.179 
  (−5.90) (−3.37)    (−0.82) 
HighLitInd − 0.051 0.068 HighLitInd   0.062 
  (0.87) (0.75)    (1.08) 
Annual dummies         
Observations  66,860 66,860   48,164 48,164 
Adj. R-squared 0.0762 0.0769   0.0528 0.0552 
